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‘We Have Friends, No Enemies’: Timor-Leste’s First Year in ASEAN

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On October 26, Timor-Leste marks the first anniversary of its admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a milestone that followed 14 years of efforts and a much longer history of struggle for independence. Its accession as the bloc’s 11th member was celebrated as the completion of Southeast Asia’s regional family. Yet behind the diplomatic celebrations lies a more complicated reality. Timor-Leste is entering an organization whose political traditions and practices do not always sit comfortably with the principles that have shaped its own foreign policy.

While Timor-Leste’s resistance against Indonesian occupation is well known, considerably less attention has been paid to its foreign policy and relations with major powers. Dili has occasionally taken positions that have unsettled its neighbors. Myanmar’s military authorities expelled Timorese diplomats twice, first in 2023 following Dili’s engagement with the opposition National Unity Government (NUG), and again in February 2026, following the filing of a criminal complaint in Timor-Leste against senior Myanmar military officials over alleged atrocities. The second expulsion came barely four months after ASEAN accession, exposing the tensions between Dili’s commitment to international justice and the bloc’s longstanding principle of non-interference.

These tensions extend beyond Myanmar. Timor-Leste’s relationship with Indonesia remains shadowed by unresolved questions of justice, accountability, and reparations, while its relationships with China, the United States, and Australia require careful navigation amid intensifying geopolitical competition. At home, ASEAN membership brings demanding economic and institutional obligations, growing concerns over transnational crime and the responsibility of chairing ASEAN in 2029. For a small state whose independence depended heavily on international solidarity, membership offers greater diplomatic influence, but also new pressures to compromise. How Dili manages these competing pressures will reveal much about the kind of regional actor it intends to become.

In this inaugural interview for Conversations on Southeast Asia, a new Diplomat interview series hosted by Khoo Ying Hooi, Timor-Leste’s Vice Minister for ASEAN Affairs, Milena Maria da Costa Rangel, speaks about the country’s first year in ASEAN and the political and practical choices confronting Dili.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Timor-Leste joined ASEAN on October 26, 2025, with substantial legal and institutional commitments under its accession roadmap and access to development assistance through the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). One year on, how far has Dili progressed in fulfilling these commitments, and how much of the promised assistance has actually materialized? Beyond the diplomatic achievement of accession, what tangible benefits can ordinary Timorese, particularly businesses and young people, expect?

We remain grateful for the welcome and solidarity extended to Timor-Leste by ASEAN member states. But becoming a member is only the beginning of a much longer process.

Our first year of membership has focused on translating the achievement of accession into coordinated implementation across government. On the legal instruments, Timor-Leste had acceded to most of the 66 instruments under Priority 1 of the accession roadmap [the Roadmap for Timor-Leste’s Full Membership in ASEAN] before joining ASEAN. Two instruments relating to the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement remain under discussion, particularly regarding the common legal framework and domestic procedures required by member states.

We are also working with the ASEAN Secretariat to review the economic agreements under the remaining priorities. Some agreements have expired, have not entered into force, or have been replaced. As a result, the number under Priority 2 has been reduced from 48 to 35, and under Priority 3 from 106 to 62. The review has also identified 45 additional agreements that Timor-Leste will need to address. Domestic preparations for accession to the remaining economic agreements are under way.

In terms of assistance, Timor-Leste has benefited from the IAI since May 2024, even before becoming a full member. We are now covered by IAI Work Plan V for 2026–2030, which offers technical assistance and capacity-building in trade, agriculture, education, skills development, and institutional strengthening.

We have established a national task force with focal points in relevant ministries to identify priorities and develop proposals. So far, we have developed six initial project concepts, three of which have been finalized and submitted to the ASEAN Secretariat. They cover areas including sustainable tourism, youth capacity-building, digital skills for primary school teachers, and more resilient coffee production. The challenge now is to turn these proposals into funded projects that produce practical results.

Milena Maria da Costa Rangel, Timor-Leste’s vice minister for ASEAN affairs. (Photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste)

For businesses and young people, ASEAN membership opens access to a much larger market and new opportunities in trade, investment, education, and skills development. But these benefits will not come automatically. Our businesses still face challenges in production capacity, competitiveness, and meeting regional standards. We also need to improve young people’s skills and qualifications so they can make use of these opportunities.

We recognize that many of the obligations require action now, while some of the economic benefits will take longer to emerge. That is why we are taking a phased approach, based on national priorities, institutional capacity, and the timelines agreed with ASEAN.

On October 21, the Council of Ministers approved the National Roadmap for the Implementation of ASEAN Economic Commitments for 2026–2030, accompanied by 19 sectoral strategic action plans and 19 sectoral work plans. These set out the reforms and responsibilities across government. Our focus is not simply to meet legal requirements, but to use membership to support economic diversification, stronger institutions, private sector development, and better opportunities for our people.

Turning to relations with Indonesia, the two countries often present their relationship as a model of post-conflict reconciliation. Yet the 2008 Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) acknowledged the serious violations committed during the 1999 violence, while justice and reparations remain unresolved for many victims. Has political reconciliation moved ahead at the expense of justice? Now that both countries sit together in ASEAN, is this chapter effectively closed?

Timor-Leste and Indonesia share a difficult and bitter history. Over the years, however, we have made significant progress in building a peaceful and constructive relationship based on mutual respect, dialogue, and cooperation. This reconciliation is something both countries can be proud of.

At the same time, reconciliation does not mean forgetting the past. We recognize the suffering of victims and their families, and we understand that justice, accountability, and reparations remain important. The CTF helped acknowledge what happened in 1999. At the national level, the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation documented past human rights violations in its Chega! report and made important recommendations.

We need to continue preserving historical memory, supporting victims, and advancing a national reparations policy. Membership of ASEAN does not close this chapter. It provides an additional setting for cooperation between two sovereign neighbors, while the needs and dignity of victims remain important in their own rights.

Indonesia is one of our closest neighbors and an important partner in trade, investment, education, security, and regional cooperation. For us, reconciliation means acknowledging the past, addressing its consequences, and building a better relationship for the future. But there is still work to be done on the recommendations of the Chega! report. In that sense, reconciliation remains an ongoing process.

One of ASEAN’s most contentious issues is Myanmar. Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military-backed leader, has visited five ASEAN member states, most recently Malaysia. These developments raise concerns about the gradual normalization of Myanmar’s military-backed leadership, despite the lack of meaningful progress on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. How does Timor-Leste view these developments? What is Dili’s position on engagement with the NUG, and how should Myanmar’s representation in ASEAN relate to progress on the Five-Point Consensus?

Timor-Leste’s position on Myanmar is guided by our commitment to peace, democracy, and international law. These principles remain central to our foreign policy as we engage with other ASEAN member states.

We recognize that the situation in Myanmar is complex, and we are deeply concerned about the continued violence, humanitarian suffering, and its impact on civilians. We believe inclusive dialogue is essential.

Engagement with all relevant stakeholders, including different political groups, should contribute to ending the violence, facilitating political dialogue, and achieving meaningful reconciliation and lasting peace.

Regarding the NUG and other stakeholders, our position is that an inclusive process is indispensable to a peaceful and sustainable solution. We should not focus on only one group while excluding others. At the same time, we respect Myanmar’s sovereignty and recognize its importance in addressing the crisis.

ASEAN membership does not require Timor-Leste to abandon its principles. It provides another platform through which we can advance them collectively. We continue to support the full and effective implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the principal framework for addressing the crisis, and we support ASEAN’s established position concerning Myanmar’s representation at high-level meetings. Engagement should help reduce violence, improve humanitarian access, and create conditions for an inclusive, Myanmar-owned political process.

We take note of the engagement by some ASEAN member states with the Myanmar authorities and will continue to follow developments closely. One thing is certain: Myanmar remains an integral part of the ASEAN family.

Timor-Leste has long emphasized democracy and human rights in its foreign policy, reflecting its own struggle for independence. ASEAN, however, places considerable weight on non-interference. How does Dili reconcile these competing commitments?

We do not see respect for sovereignty and the promotion of human rights as mutually exclusive. Timor-Leste’s approach is to uphold these commitments together. Respect for non-interference is essential to relations among sovereign states, while dialogue, humanitarian cooperation, and collectively agreed ASEAN action can also address matters of shared concern.

Our own history reinforces the importance of dignity, self-determination, and peaceful solutions. Within ASEAN, we seek to contribute constructively through consultation and cooperation, with respect for the Charter and international law.

The objective is not to choose one principle and disregard another, but to ensure that ASEAN’s principles work together in support of peace and the well-being of its peoples.

A series of police operations this year uncovered online scam operations in Timor-Leste, raising concerns about the spread of transnational criminal networks into the country. Why has Timor-Leste become vulnerable, and how will the government’s National Integrated Plan to combat online scams, organized cybercrime, and human trafficking for 2026–2031 translate into practical cooperation with ASEAN partners?

Online scams, cybercrime, and human trafficking are linked to organized criminal networks operating across borders. This is a regional problem, but also a global one. Timor-Leste is not immune to these risks. We are still building our institutions and strengthening our legal and law enforcement systems. These activities threaten our national security, economy, international reputation, and investment environment, so we take them seriously.

Our authorities have already investigated and disrupted suspected scam operations despite limited resources. The government has also taken steps to revoke online gambling and betting licenses and restrict related activities. As you rightly mentioned, the National Integrated Plan for 2026–2031 is aimed at strengthening the response to online scams, organized cybercrime, and human trafficking. But adopting a plan is only the beginning. The real challenge lies in implementation and enforcement.

ASEAN membership gives us more opportunities to work with our neighbors, including through ASEANAPOL [Association of Southeast Asian Nations Chiefs of Police] and other regional mechanisms. Cooperation must involve information-sharing, joint investigations, tracing financial flows, and preventing criminal networks from simply relocating across borders.

Public awareness is equally important, especially among young people and vulnerable communities who may be targeted through fraudulent recruitment or promises of easy employment. We recognize that gaps remain in our regulatory and enforcement capacity. Addressing them will take stronger domestic coordination and sustained cooperation with regional and international partners. No country can deal with these networks alone.

Timor-Leste elevated its relationship with China to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 while maintaining close ties with the United States and Australia. As U.S.-China rivalry intensifies, how does Dili seek to preserve its foreign policy independence amid competing major-power interests? Does ASEAN offer smaller states meaningful protection from external pressures, or is the organization itself increasingly constrained by these rivalries?

Our foreign policy is guided by our national interests and by the principles enshrined in our Constitution. We believe in maintaining friendly relations with all countries. Our philosophy is that we have friends, no enemies. Our foreign policy starts at home. Our international engagement is rooted in our national values, our commitment to peace, and our respect for international law.

We value our relationships with China, the United States, Australia, and other partners because each contributes in different ways to national development. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China offers opportunities in infrastructure, agriculture, and economic development. At the same time, we have strong partnerships with Australia, the United States, and other countries in education, security, and institutional development. We see these partnerships as complementary rather than competing.

On defense and security cooperation, our priority is to strengthen national capacity, protect sovereignty, and contribute to regional peace and stability. The same principle applies to infrastructure and foreign investment. Cooperation has to serve our national development priorities.

We recognize that major-power competition creates challenges, especially for small states. But our approach is not about choosing sides. It is about making independent decisions based on our national interests and long-term development needs.

This is where ASEAN membership is important. ASEAN provides countries of different sizes with a platform to engage in regional discussions, deepen cooperation, and uphold shared principles such as sovereignty and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Its members have different perspectives and interests, and reaching common positions can be difficult. Nevertheless, dialogue and the search for consensus remain important. We believe ASEAN unity and centrality are essential to regional peace and stability.

During Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Dili in January 2026, the two countries signed the New Partnership for a New Era, with Canberra pledging additional assistance for Timor-Leste’s ASEAN integration. Yet the development of Greater Sunrise remains unresolved. Has ASEAN membership strengthened Dili’s diplomatic leverage with Australia, and how can Timor-Leste ensure that its regional priorities remain independent of Canberra’s strategic interests?

Australia is our immediate neighbor and has been an important development partner since the restoration of our independence. Its support for national development, human capital, and institutional capacity-building has been significant. We particularly value its assistance with our integration into ASEAN.

The New Partnership for a New Era reflects our shared commitment to economic development, education, security, and regional integration. But I want to emphasize that Timor-Leste’s foreign policy and regional priorities are guided by our own national interests and development needs. Strengthening our relationship with Australia and deepening our engagement within ASEAN are not competing objectives.

Greater Sunrise is important to our economic future and to the bilateral relationship. The 2018 Maritime Boundary Treaty was a major achievement. It demonstrated that disputes can be resolved peacefully through dialogue and international law. We continue to work with Australia and the Greater Sunrise joint venture to move the project forward. Significant progress has been made, but further negotiations are needed. Our priority is to ensure that the project creates jobs, supports economic development, and delivers long-term benefits to our people.

Australia also has a long history of engagement with ASEAN. For Timor-Leste, membership creates additional opportunities to work directly with our regional neighbors, build partnerships, and pursue our own development priorities.

Timor-Leste is scheduled to assume the ASEAN chairmanship in 2029, only four years after its accession. Yet the government’s own preliminary assessment identified significant gaps in infrastructure, accommodation, trained personnel, and logistical capacity. With less than three years remaining, what measurable progress has been made, how much funding has actually been secured, and what concrete benchmarks will determine whether Dili is ready to take on the chairmanship?

We recognize that assuming the ASEAN chairmanship in 2029 will be a significant responsibility for Timor-Leste. We also see it as an opportunity to strengthen national institutions, develop human and technical capacity, and contribute more actively to ASEAN community-building.

Chairing ASEAN involves much more than hosting high-level meetings. It requires adequate infrastructure, accommodation, transport, security, trained personnel, funding, and coordination across government. Our preliminary assessment has identified gaps, and we are taking them seriously.

We started preparations early. In February 2026, the government established the ASEAN Chairship National Organizing Committee, or ACNOC, chaired by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, with an executive committee led by Foreign Minister Bendito dos Santos Freitas. Its work covers five priority areas: human resources and institutional capacity; infrastructure and facilities; security and public order; communication and diplomacy; and finance and coordination.

Work is underway to expand and modernize Dili’s international airport, and preparations are progressing for an international convention center and other meeting facilities. We are strengthening officials’ skills in protocol, diplomacy, meeting management, security, communications, and logistics. We are also receiving assistance and training from other ASEAN member states.

On the financing side, we are assessing budgetary requirements, identifying funding sources, and coordinating with development partners. Funding for preparations in 2027 and 2028, and for some infrastructure work before 2029, is part of that process. We are aware that plans and coordination structures are not enough. We need clear timelines, adequate funding, implementation, and regular monitoring.

If those gaps cannot be resolved in time, would Dili consider postponing its turn?

Our focus remains on preparing to assume the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2029. We are approaching that responsibility seriously, through coordinated planning, measurable milestones, and cooperation with ASEAN partners. We want this responsibility to leave a lasting legacy for better infrastructure, stronger institutions, more skilled personnel, and a greater capacity to contribute to regional cooperation.

There are options that could be considered; we would discuss such arrangements with other member states if necessary. Any matter affecting ASEAN’s collective arrangements would be considered through the appropriate ASEAN processes. For now, our priority is to address the identified gaps and ensure that our preparations deliver lasting benefits for Timor-Leste.

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