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The arrangement fast-tracks military cooperation between Canberra and Manila.
Central to Australia’s security policies is the recognition that its reliance on seaborne trade is one of its most critical exposures. Australia’s prosperity depends on sea lanes that it cannot defend alone, and much of its trade passes through or near to the South China Sea. China’s militarization and assertive behavior in this region therefore poses a considerable threat to Australia’s way of life. As such, building trusted and cooperative partnerships in Southeast Asia are essential to Australia’s interests. Increasingly, the Philippines is being viewed in Canberra as one of Australia’s most important relationships.
This week, Australia and the Philippines signed a new Defense Cooperation Arrangement in Manila, on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit. The arrangement replaces the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Defense Activities between the two countries, and builds upon the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement which entered into force in 2012, and the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement from 2022.
The intent is to fast-track military cooperation between Canberra and Manila. It is designed to ease bureaucratic hurdles to joint activities by simplifying the procedures of the visiting forces agreement. But it also covers areas like maritime awareness, information sharing, strategic dialogues, training, interoperability and defense infrastructure. Alongside this, the arrangement seeks to expand support for the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard – both of which are on the frontline of China’s revisionist activities in the South China Sea.
This support is already considerable. Australia has provided around $9.5 million to the Philippine Coast Guard since April last year, mostly drones and operator training. Australia is also helping build defense infrastructure across five military bases on the Philippines’ largest island of Luzon. Given that the Taiwan Strait is also a potential regional hotspot, these bases are part of a broader effort to deter China from aggression action.
For the Philippines, the partnership with Australia is related to something more immediate. China uses gray-zone tactics, such as water cannon fire and maritime harassment, against the Philippines to apply pressure. These coercive tactics are significant but fall short of acts of war. Coast guard clashes are frequent in the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal as China continues to ignore the 2016 arbitral ruling that found its maritime claims in the South China Sea have no legal basis under international law.
Beijing has seen the war in Iran as a new opportunity to further test the Philippines. With United States naval forces being drawn toward the Middle East, China has intensified its operations around the Philippines and extended them east of Taiwan into the Pacific, in what appears to be an attempt to exploit the shortage of U.S. assets and attention.
Manila cannot match China’s maritime presence, so it needs partners that can provide better surveillance, more naval and coast guard resources, and training. While the Philippines has its alliance with the United States, it also requires a thick web of security relationships with other capable regional states. Each partner it adds to provide assistance raises the diplomatic cost of Beijing of pressing harder.
The ability to send strong signals of deterrence also matters. The new defense arrangement comes as Australia, the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines plan a Combined Coordination Center to build the capacity of the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard. The central purpose is to synchronize the four countries’ defense investments in support of the Philippines’ defense of its archipelago. It is expected to act as a joint hub for building the capacity of the Philippine Navy and coast guard. The aim is to coordinate what each partner provides, so that support from four governments doesn’t arrive piecemeal.
For Australia there is also the need for it to gain a greater presence and influence in a theater that matters the most to its trading interests. Australia has made it clear that it sees defending its prosperity, not just its territory, as central to its defense strategy. It is in the Philippines where the threat to Australia’s trading interests is being most tested. If Beijing can wear down Manila, it incentivizes it to use the same tactics on other states. Investing in Manila’s resilience is currently far cheaper for Australia than responding to any further changes in conditions in the South China Sea.


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