China’s top military command has been almost emptied out. Of the seven members chosen for the Central Military Commission in 2022, only Xi Jinping and one general remain active. Days before Xi met U.S. President Donlald Trump in Washington last month, Beijing formally expelled Gen. Zhang Youxia, Xi’s longtime ally and former top military deputy, and Gen. Liu Zhenli, the former chief of the Joint Staff Department.

We do not know why Xi is doing this or what he intends to do next. But the purge has further strengthened his hand over the military. Reuters reported that analysts see Xi’s grip on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as strengthened by the removal of senior commanders and their protégés even as the upheaval weakens near-term readiness. If Xi chooses to invade Taiwan, impose a blockade, or undertake another act of military aggression in the region, more of that decision now rests with him. We do not know whether he will. That freer hand adds risk.

The scale of the purge is extraordinary. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that 41 of the 47 officers who held three-star rank in 2022 or were promoted afterward had been purged or potentially purged. Of the 35 three-star generals and admirals Xi promoted beginning in 2020, 32 had been investigated and 29 had been purged or potentially purged. Across the PLA, roughly 52 percent of senior leadership positions have been affected.

CSIS concluded that vacant posts and less experienced officers would complicate large-scale operations against Taiwan, including a blockade or amphibious assault. But we should not assume those complications will last. Taiwan’s defense ministry has warned of “rising unpredictability” in Chinese decision-making amid the purge. With this much upheaval in Beijing and more authority concentrated in Xi’s hands, steady, credible deterrence from Washington matters even more. Beijing should have no reason to believe an invasion, blockade or other act of aggression against Taiwan could succeed.

That means three things.

First, we should not answer upheaval in Beijing by creating upheaval at the Pentagon. One of America’s greatest military advantages is our professional officer corps, whose duty is to the constitution rather than a ruling party. Yet in 2025, Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth removed Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. C.Q. Brown along with five other senior generals and admirals. In April, Hegseth abruptly removed Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George with more than a year remaining in his term while American forces were fighting in the Middle East. The Pentagon gave no public reason, and Reuters noted that removing a service chief during wartime is “extremely rare.” Experienced commanders who are prepared to give presidents unwelcome advice make our military stronger.

Second, our military resources have to match our priorities. The Iran war is draining weapons that matter for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. In September, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the war had cost the Defense Department about $38 billion through August 1, with another month costing $2 billion to $3 billion depending on the intensity of fighting. More importantly, CBO found that heavy use of missile-defense interceptors will leave U.S. inventories reduced for several years and warned that the shortfall would be especially problematic in a conflict with China over Taiwan. If we are serious about the CCP as our foremost long-term strategic challenge, we should end the Iran war and rebuild depleted stockpiles, immediately.

Third, deterrence requires communication as well as strength. After air and maritime safety talks in May, U.S. and Chinese military representatives agreed that better communication could reduce miscalculations and the risk of unsafe encounters. With this much turnover at the top of the PLA, those channels matter even more.

We do not know Xi’s objectives. We know he has strengthened his own hand amid the uncertainty created by his purge of the military. Without any meaningful check on his power, Xi has a freer hand to pursue potentially more aggressive military decisions, adding risk to our relationship with the CCP.

Our job is not to guess Xi’s next move. It is to make sure Washington remains steady, with experienced military leadership, the weapons and forces needed to deter aggression, strong alliances, and reliable communication to keep a crisis from becoming a war.