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Orgo-Life the new way to the future Advertising by AdpathwayThailand has long prided itself on its foreign policy acumen and its status as the only nation in Southeast Asia that avoided colonization by the West. At the center of this is the notion of “bamboo diplomacy” – a form of diplomacy that prioritizes pragmatism and flexibility in pursuit of the national interest. However, in a recent article, Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi argued that memories of past Thai diplomatic successes had become a trap, that an idealized vision of its own past had the potential to restrict the country’s foreign policy – in particular, its response to the growing
Pongkwan, a lecturer in international relations at Thammasat University in Bangkok, spoke to The Diplomat’s Sebastian Strangio about the origins of “bamboo diplomacy,” and how history informs Thailand’s present diplomatic behavior, and the potential for the country to become trapped by its own past successes.
To begin with, what are the main principles of “bamboo diplomacy”? To what extent does it even constitute a coherent doctrine?
Bamboo diplomacy draws on the analogy of bamboo bending with the wind. Rather than standing rigidly against strong winds and risking being broken, bamboo survives by adapting to changing conditions. Applied to foreign policy, the analogy emphasizes prudence, flexibility, and the ability to gauge the direction of great power competition before committing to a particular course of action.
In the language of modern international relations, bamboo diplomacy can encompass both bandwagoning and hedging, depending on the circumstances. When the winds blow strongly in one direction, Thailand may find it necessary to align itself with the dominant power. When the balance of power is less clear, Thailand may instead hedge by maintaining relations with competing powers and avoiding firm commitments to either side.
This is also why I would hesitate to characterize bamboo diplomacy as a coherent doctrine. It is better understood as a broad diplomatic philosophy that prioritizes adaptability and survival rather than a clearly defined set of foreign policy principles. Its flexibility allows Thai policymakers to justify different, and sometimes contradictory, strategies under the same label. In this sense, bamboo diplomacy tells us more about how Thailand understands its approach to navigating great power competition than about the specific policies.
Your article explores how memories of past Thai diplomatic successes – in particular, Thailand’s avoidance of colonization by the West and its management of relations with the Allies in the aftermath of WWII – have shaped Thai diplomatic practice, trapping the country in “a pattern of light hedging and ambiguous foreign policy positioning.” Why do you think these memories have exercised such a hold, and how much can they be attributed to Thai efforts, as opposed to circumstances beyond Thailand’s control?
Broadly speaking, these two historical episodes are influential because they shape how Thailand understands its own survival during existential crises. They are remembered as critical junctures at which Thailand successfully navigated the challenges posed by great powers. The avoidance of colonization, in particular, has a powerful place in the Thai national narrative because it is closely associated with the prudence and diplomatic skills of King Rama V. This narrative has also been repeatedly glorified as part of the broader effort to legitimize and institutionalize the monarchy.
I am not suggesting that diplomacy played no role in Thailand’s survival. Rather, my concern is that these historical narratives tend to overemphasize Thailand’s diplomatic agency while overlooking the external circumstances that contributed to its success.
Take the avoidance of colonization, for example. It is true that Siam undertook significant modernization efforts, adopted Western institutions, pursued closer relations with Western powers, and opened its economy to international trade. These were important diplomatic and political choices. But timing and geography also worked in Siam’s favor. Its position between the British and French colonial territories gave both powers an interest in maintaining Siam as a buffer. Moreover, as European powers became increasingly preoccupied with rivalries on the continent, further expansion into Siam carried the risk of provoking tensions with other colonial powers. In other words, Siam’s survival cannot be explained by diplomatic skill alone.
The Second World War is somewhat different. Unlike the colonial episode, the popular narrative does not necessarily attribute Thailand’s survival to a single individual. There are references to the Free Thai Movement, although its role in helping Thailand avoid the consequences of being treated as a defeated country is not always clearly articulated. What tends to be remembered, however, is that Thailand once again managed to navigate a major international crisis successfully. This narrative often overlooks the broader geopolitical context, particularly Thailand’s strategic value to the United States in the emerging Cold War order.
The problem with these narratives is that they place too much emphasis on agency and too little on structure. By attributing Thailand’s historical successes primarily to its own diplomatic prudence, they risk creating the impression that the same approach can be replicated regardless of changing international circumstances.
How and when were these episodes enshrined as a coherent doctrine, and for what purpose? By what process have they come to shape how policymakers interpret contemporary challenges?
According to Jittipat Poonkham, the author of “A Genealogy of Bamboo Diplomacy” (2022), these historical episodes were retrospectively incorporated into a coherent narrative of Thai diplomacy through the efforts of prominent foreign policymakers in the late 1960s and 1970s, as well as international relations scholars during the period.
As Jittipat explains, Thai policymakers faced considerable challenges in moving away from their rigid alignment with the United States toward a more flexible diplomatic approach, particularly as they sought détente with China and the Soviet Union. To justify this shift, proponents of flexible diplomacy invoked Thailand’s historical experiences, particularly its avoidance of colonization, as evidence of a long-standing tradition of diplomatic flexibility. This helped legitimize a significant departure from Thailand’s previously rigid anticommunist foreign policy by presenting it as a continuation of the country’s established diplomatic tradition rather than a radical change.
As for how this narrative shapes policymakers’ interpretation of contemporary challenges, I am still collecting evidence and would hesitate to draw definitive conclusions at this stage. What I would argue, however, is that bamboo diplomacy has become something of a script of survival for Thailand. It has become the default foreign policy approach in the absence of deliberate efforts to develop an alternative foreign policy strategy. As Jittipat argues in his article on “hedging by default,” what appears to be a carefully calibrated hedging strategy may actually reflect the absence of coherent strategic planning. In this sense, bamboo diplomacy may continue to shape Thailand’s foreign policy because it has become an established way of thinking about how Thailand should survive amid great power competition.
Can you give some examples of how this “script of survival” has influenced the country’s diplomacy in the current era?
One obvious example is Thailand’s 20-Year National Strategy (2018-2037) and its accompanying Foreign Affairs Master Plan, which reflect the principles of bamboo diplomacy by emphasizing the importance of maintaining balanced and neutral relations with major powers and adapting to changes in the international environment. However, as with bamboo diplomacy more generally, these plans remain broad, without clearly identifying specific foreign policy priorities or concrete steps to achieve their objectives.
We can also see this script of survival at work in Thailand’s response to intensifying competition between China and the United States. Successive Thai governments have sought to maintain good relations with both powers without clearly articulating or communicating their strategic priorities or policy red lines. This tendency to avoid firm commitments is also reflected in Thailand’s abstentions on several UN resolutions concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The underlying problem is that the belief in diplomatic flexibility as a means of survival, as reflected in the Foreign Affairs Master Plan, may lead policymakers to pay insufficient attention to changing external circumstances and the constraints they impose. By treating flexibility and neutrality as inherent diplomatic advantages, Thailand risks overlooking the possibility that intensifying great power competition may increasingly limit its ability to maintain such a position.
How well suited do you think “bamboo diplomacy” is to the current international environment? In what ways do these memories of past successes constrain Thailand’s diplomatic options today?
I am not suggesting that Thailand needs to pick a side amid intensifying geopolitical competition. After all, hedging remains a viable strategy for many small and middle powers. What I am arguing, however, is that predictability may be an increasingly important diplomatic advantage, if Thailand wants to position itself as a leading hub of international engagement, as envisioned in its Foreign Affairs Master Plan. The problem with bamboo diplomacy is that its emphasis on flexibility does not necessarily translate into clear foreign policy commitments, making it difficult for other countries to anticipate what Thailand is willing or unwilling to do.
For example, while Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Master Plan emphasizes neutrality as a diplomatic advantage, the highly publicized displays of close relations between Thai leaders and China, along with repeated references to China as an “elder brother,” may raise questions about Thailand’s actual position. When a country’s intentions and commitments are unclear, foreign partners may find it more difficult to regard it as a predictable and reliable partner. This could, in turn, constrain Thailand’s ability to play the international role it aspires to.
All in all, Thailand does not need to choose a side, but it does need to communicate clearly what it wants to achieve, what it is willing to do, and where its limits lie. Greater predictability could help Thailand build trust with its partners and enhance its relevance in international affairs.
Are there any competing narratives in Thai diplomatic history that offer a counterpoint to “bamboo diplomacy,” and do you see the potential for a shift in Thailand’s approach?
I am not sure whether these alternative approaches have developed into coherent narratives comparable to bamboo diplomacy, but there have been several attempts to pursue different policy directions. These include economic and trade diplomacy under Chatichai Choonhavan and Thaksin Shinawatra, the middle-power diplomacy recently advocated by Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, and the emerging emphasis on science and technology diplomacy under the current administration.
Some of these approaches share overlapping ambitions. For example, Thaksin’s trade diplomacy sought to enhance Thailand’s regional leadership through initiatives such as the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and greater regional economic integration. Similarly, the recent emphasis on middle-power diplomacy seeks to enhance Thailand’s relevance and influence in international affairs.
However, these approaches do not necessarily pose a direct competition with bamboo diplomacy. Trade diplomacy, for example, can coexist with flexible relations among major powers. The more meaningful departure would be a shift from treating survival and autonomy as Thailand’s principal diplomatic objectives toward defining the specific international roles Thailand wants to play and the contributions it seeks to make.
As for whether these approaches can produce a lasting shift, I remain uncertain. As the emergence of bamboo diplomacy in the 1970s demonstrates, establishing a dominant foreign policy narrative requires sustained efforts from both policymakers and the academic community. In today’s polarized domestic political environment, compounded by rapid geopolitical changes and ongoing tensions with neighboring countries, sustaining such efforts may prove particularly challenging. As a result, alternative approaches may struggle to become institutionalized and outlast the governments that introduce them.


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