On October 23, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who is serving his fifth term, was acquitted on appeal of charges that he had a backer cover the cost of opinion polls he received from political broker Myung Tae-kyun ahead of the 2021 Seoul mayoral by-election. 

The appellate court overturned the first-instance guilty verdict, which had fined Oh 10 million won, far above the threshold that would have cost him his office under South Korean election law. The case now heads to the Supreme Court, and the special counsel and Oh’s defense are expected to clash over how far the remaining evidence supports Myung’s testimony, which the first-instance court found partly credible but the appellate court did not. 

Oh’s acquittal shifted the balance of power within the conservative camp, which is divided among People Power Party (PPP) chair Jang Dong-hyeok, former PPP leader turned independent Han Dong-hoon, and Oh himself. In a presidential preference poll released on November 4, Oh took the lead with 20.4 percent, up 8.4 percentage points after the appeal, followed by Han with 14.3 percent and Jang with 12.7 percent. 

Oh’s rise is good news for the reconstruction of South Korean conservative politics, which is still struggling to fully escape the shadow of the 2024 martial law crisis under Jang’s party leadership. As Jang’s two-year term ends in August 2027, the next party chair race will become the main battleground for Oh and Han to seize control of the party ahead of the 2028 general election. 

However, neither Oh nor Han can fight directly. Oh, as the sitting mayor of Seoul, cannot run for the post, while Han remains outside the party. Han’s readmission to the PPP, in particular, seems almost impossible under the leadership of Jang, who expelled him in January over allegations that Han’s family had posted malicious messages on the party’s internal board, targeting the former first couple and other party figures.

The conservative camp is therefore moving toward a proxy battle against Jang, who has signaled he may seek a second term. The contest is likely to take shape around factional lawmakers such as Kim Jae-seop on Oh’s side and Bae Hyun-jin on Han’s, as well as veterans such as Kim Gi-hyeon and Yoon Sang-hyeon, who may maneuver between the two sides, and senior figures outside the National Assembly such as Yoo Seong-min.

What ultimately divides these players is a question of direction. Oh and Han differ from Jang over whether to court moderate voters or hold onto the hardline base. Both Oh and Han have distanced themselves from former President Yoon Suk-yeol, arguing that reviving South Korean conservatism requires decoupling from the “Yoon again” protesters who defend martial law, reject Yoon’s impeachment, and promote election-fraud conspiracy theories.

Jang, by contrast, rose to the PPP chair position with strong backing from the party’s hardline supporters. He has sought to consolidate his support by championing their positions, openly defending Yoon after the declaration of martial law, for instance. He has also become a prominent presence at the Olympic Park protest site, where the movement shifted in character after groups that continue to allege fraud in the June local elections took the lead.

Oh and Han have accused Jang of aligning with hardliners rather than reaching out to moderates. The PPP’s approval rating fell to a record low of 18 percent in April, as the leadership hesitated to cut ties with Yoon. During the June local elections, many PPP candidates had to keep their distance from the party leadership, with Oh refusing to campaign alongside Jang. The PPP won only four out of 16 mayoral and provincial races, and calls for Jang to resign have only grown since.

Yet both Oh’s and Han’s competing ambitions to take the lead could prevent moderates from rallying behind a single challenger, giving a further advantage to the incumbent, who is already well entrenched. On October 25, Jang became the longest-serving party chair in the PPP’s short history, outlasting Han and every chair before him without facing a single confidence vote.

As the poll leader, Oh has moved to reassert himself, clashing with President Lee Jae-myung not only on housing but on broader issues such as the government’s handling of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, a subject that a mayor would not normally be expected to address. But strong numbers aside, Oh has long been out of legislative politics, and building and maintaining a bloc of loyal lawmakers as an outsider may take considerable time and effort. And although he was acquitted on appeal, he still awaits the Supreme Court’s ruling.

For Han, the urgency is greater. Despite his dramatic June by-election win in Busan as an independent, his entry into the National Assembly as a lawmaker has yet to meaningfully weaken Jang’s grip on the PPP or to restore Han’s party membership. Jang has repeatedly ruled out Han’s reinstatement. 

Jang can afford this position because there are PPP supporters who still see Han as a traitor for leading the party to vote for Yoon’s impeachment. The Democratic Party needed votes from PPP lawmakers to reach the two-thirds majority required for an impeachment motion the legislature. Whatever the merits of Han’s stance, his decision to break with Yoon left him exposed, and Jang has made the most of the “traitor” framing to sideline him. Overcoming this resistance within the PPP remains Han’s biggest challenge. 

Oh and Han have signaled the possibility of forming an alliance, but Oh is in no hurry. He can maintain his polling lead while focusing on running Seoul. He embraces the need for conservative unity against the Lee government and the ruling Democratic Party. He has also appeared alongside Jang in public several times recently, with Jang saying that the PPP and the Seoul Metropolitan Government should work together. 

Oh’s current posture marks a shift from his election campaign in June, when he kept his distance from Jang. He may also find cooperation with Jang more appealing than an alliance with Han, who remains outside the party. Although such cooperation would complicate his efforts to reposition the PPP toward the center, Oh may choose to prioritize strengthening his standing within the party over confronting his ideological differences with Jang.

Oh has also taken a cautious approach to Han’s reinstatement, suggesting that a consensus among a majority of party members should come first. When it comes to Han as a potential rival in the next presidential race, he may quietly share Jang’s view in the long run. 

Yet leaning on Jang carries its own risks. Should Jang win re-election, his continued grip on the chair would constrain how much of the party Oh can bend to his own line from outside the National Assembly, however closely the two work together. He would be left to eye the next presidential race without a party truly his own. 

Han’s calculation seems starker. His ultimate ambition is also the presidency, but that road runs through the PPP, and rejoining the party is the prerequisite. Unlike Oh, he can run for the party chair once reinstated. But if he puts readmission first, he will have to yield in the immediate contest for power.

The conservative camp is heading into a proxy battle in which neither Oh nor Han can afford to remain on the sidelines, nor can either take on Jang directly. The outcome will ultimately depend not only on how effectively they challenge Jang and his loyalists, but also on whether they can keep their own competition from splitting the conservative camp to his advantage. The struggle to reconstruct South Korean conservatism is therefore becoming a contest not only against Jang, but also between the competing ambitions of its two front-runners.