Chinese outposts in the South China Sea could be sacrificial lambs—ultimately lost, but formidable enough to bog down foreign forces as Beijing executes a swift military takeover of Taiwan, a Taiwanese government report reviewed by Radio Free Asia revealed.

Beijing’s maritime outposts could provide enough distraction during a critical 48 to 72 hour window—just enough time for Beijing to conduct amphibious landings and set up a blockade, said the report, commissioned by Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council, the government body responsible for China policy and cross-strait relations, and conducted by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Experts told RFA that although the Chinese buildup in the South China Sea is likely connected to Taiwan, a democratic island which Beijing considers to be its territory, the scenario discussed in the report lacks adequate substantiation through high-level simulation.

“The report’s headline figure of a 48-to-72-hour delay is its own estimate, not something validated by any rigorous test like an open wargame,” Ray Powell, executive director of Stanford University’s SeaLight maritime transparency project, told RFA.

Powell said the logic in the report does however “make sense.”

“Distributed, expendable outposts do complicate an adversary’s planning,” he said. “But a complication is not necessarily a roadblock, and the routes that matter most for Taiwan run through the Bashi Channel and the Philippine Sea, not the South China Sea.”

Land reclamation

The report was heavily focused on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, where China has reclaimed about 600 hectares (1,480 acres) of land.

The development forms part of Beijing’s broader “active defense” strategy, integrating reclaimed islands into a regional defense network designed to fragment potential U.S. intervention routes and transform the South China Sea into a protected operating zone for Chinese submarines, the report said.

Vietnam-Construction-Spratly-Island-6 Antelope Reef is China’s newest artificial island in the South China Sea. Analysts say the outpost could strengthen Beijing’s administrative presence and maritime surveillance in the disputed Spratly Islands. (RFA)

Under that framework, facilities such as Antelope Reef could serve as forward operating bases for China’s coast guard, maritime militia and military forces. The report says they could eventually host surveillance systems, electronic warfare capabilities and anti-ship missiles capable of extending China’s anti-access and area-denial network deeper into the South China Sea.

U.S. carrier strike groups and other naval forces approaching Taiwan through the South China Sea could be forced either to contend with missile, air defense and electronic warfare threats from these Chinese outposts or reroute through alternative approaches such as the Bashi Channel or Miyako Strait, increasing operational costs and travel times, the report said.

Powell also noted that many of the military capabilities described in the report have yet to materialise at Antelope Reef itself.

“What’s actually at Antelope today is reclaimed land, berths and channels—not yet the sensor-and-missile node the report describes,” he said. “That’s a forecast based on China’s Spratly playbook and it may prove right, but the report is analyzing a capability still under construction.”

He added that Antelope Reef’s location in the western Paracels raises questions about its relative importance in a Taiwan contingency.

“Antelope sits in the western Paracels facing Vietnam. Its value to a Taiwan fight relative to China’s many other operational locations across the mainland and the South China Sea is not immediately apparent.”

Broader strategy

Other analysts said that focusing solely on military capabilities risks overlooking the broader strategic effects of China’s activities in the region.

Sze-Fung Lee, an independent researcher specializing in Chinese hybrid warfare, told RFA the debate should not be framed as a choice between military utility and signaling value.

He said that the cognitive effects of China’s growing presence in disputed waters could shape decision-making well before any conflict begins.

“Narratives about China’s ability to delay or deny intervention don’t begin when the first shot is fired,” he said. “They’re being built now, increasingly visible in the pre-conflict information environment, and will amplify most intensely during the first hours of any operation, when allied decision-making is most fluid and most vulnerable to doubt.”

Lee said the effectiveness of such efforts would depend on a range of political and psychological factors beyond military hardware, including Taiwan’s own perceived willingness to resist and the readiness of allied governments and publics to support intervention.

china-ships-taiwan Chinese ships patrol during military drills on Pingtan island, the closest point to Taiwan, on Dec. 30, 2025. (Adek Berry/AFP)

“The difficulty in quantifying that impact isn’t incidental – it’s the point,” he said. “Gray zone and cognitive warfare are designed to be deniable, incremental, and invisible until the cumulative effect means the battle is already lost before it formally begins.”

Others see the Taiwan connection as only one part of a much larger strategic picture.

China’s South China Sea build-up appears primarily geared toward broader regional objectives, Ed Moon, an independent cross-strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA.

“My read is that the buildup is more focused on reasons that have little to do with Taiwan,” he said.

Most foreign reinforcements in a Taiwan conflict would likely approach from the northeast through Japan, Guam and Hawaii rather than from the South China Sea, he added.

Still, Moon said the report also reflects a broader shift in how Taiwan’s security establishment views developments in the South China Sea.

“We are absolutely seeing in terms of official rhetoric and indeed reports like this that Taipei is trying to link events in the South China Sea directly to Taiwan’s own safety,” he said.

The democratic island has also shown growing interest in military cooperation between the United States and regional partners, including the Philippines, as well as exercises such as Balikatan, according to Moon.

“So I think Taipei certainly views the South China Sea build-up as linked to PLA plans on Taiwan, and believes that slowing down build-up in the region would directly benefit its own safety.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.