On September 12, the University of Hong Kong’s Beijing Center held a low-profile symposium at which Chinese scholars discussed the institutional design and governance arrangements that would follow unification with Taiwan. The participants reached 12 points of consensus on how the “One Country, Two Systems” principle should be implemented in Taiwan.

All of Taiwan’s power would derive from authorization by Beijing; Taiwan’s armed forces would be disbanded and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops stationed on the island. All this while still upholding the central government’s policy on Taiwan: “peaceful reunification.” The blueprint, however, also accounts for the scenario of achieving “reunification through non-peaceful means,” which would involve a transition period of “quasi-military governance for a duration of three to five years.”

The symposium built on Xi Jinping’s 2019 speech marking the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” in which he called for exploring a “Two Systems” solution for Taiwan. The symposium was not an isolated event. Chinese scholars regularly debate and publish on how Beijing should approach unification. 

This article puts the 12-point consensus in context and compares it with the 2022 white paper “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” to assess how part of China’s scholarly community envisions governing Taiwan after unification, and where that vision departs from the contemporary official line.

One Country, Two Systems

More than 20 Chinese scholars who participated in the symposium drew on the post-handover experience Beijing has from Hong Kong and Macao, both Special Administrative Regions (SARs) that operate under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems.” 

Hong Kong was transferred from British to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, after more than 150 years of British rule following the First Opium War (1839-1842). During the negotiations, Beijing promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and pledged to maintain its capitalist system and way of life unchanged for 50 years. Macao, where Portuguese traders settled in the 1550s, was handed over to Beijing on December 20, 1999, becoming China’s second SAR.

The “One Country, Two Systems” principle was initially designed with Taiwan in mind. In September 1981, Ye Jianying, a top military leader and chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, set out a nine-point proposal for peaceful unification, which became known as “Ye’s Nine Points.” At that point, it was proposed that Taiwan would maintain a “high degree of autonomy” as an SAR. 

In 1982, Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader after Mao’s death, developed these ideas into the “One Country, Two Systems” formula. The principle was first applied to Hong Kong and later to Macao. The recent symposium attempted to spell out what a Taiwan version would involve.

The Symposium Consensus

According to the 12-point consensus, the “One Country, Two Systems” principle would be implemented whether the unification came by peacefully or via “non-peaceful means.” In a “non-peaceful” scenario, the scholars envisioned a post-conflict transition period of “quasi-military governance,” which could be implemented for a duration of three to five years, during which the central government would crack down on “Taiwan independence elements,” or (in Beijing’s terminology) “Taiwan independence separatists.” China uses the term to refer to anyone who advocates or promotes the de jure independence of Taiwan. 

The symposium’s direct discussion of the use of force against Taiwan – and what would follow – is an outlier. “Peaceful reunification” remains Beijing’s official discursive approach to Taiwan, reflected in many official documents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Force is left as a last resort aimed at external interference and a “very small number of separatists,” as stated in the 2022 white paper.

The possibility of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait is widely regarded as one of the most serious geopolitical flashpoints today. In the last decade, China has been steadily intensifying military pressure on Taiwan through a combination of large-scale military exercises and gray-zone operations around the island. 

However, many analysts argue that a large-scale military conflict across the Taiwan Strait – particularly if the United States, Japan, or other regional actors were drawn in – would carry serious risks for the CCP’s primary goal: maintaining its monopoly on political power and ensuring the regime’s survival. As a professor at MIT and China researcher M. Taylor Fravel argued, China is even more aware of such a risk since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Following the “reunification,” all existing Taiwanese armed forces would be disbanded, their weapons “collected and turned over” to the central government, and the island’s defense would become Beijing’s responsibility. The central government would station troops in Taiwan, following the practice in Hong Kong and Macao, where PLA garrisons have been present since 1997 and 1999, respectively. The 2022 white paper did not mention anything about the future of Taiwan’s military, but the 1993 white paper on “reunification” stated that Taiwan would keep its own military and the mainland would not send troops or administrative personnel to Taiwan.

According to the symposium’s 12-point plan, Taiwanese people would also be allowed to voluntarily enlist in the PLA. The PLA is the armed force of the CCP, which commands it through the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi Jinping, following the principle that “the party commands the gun.” Taiwan’s armed forces, by contrast, are constitutionally required to stand above party affiliation, as stated in Article 138 of the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC). 

Matters of security, defense, and foreign affairs involving Taiwan are expected to be the sole responsibility of the central government in Beijing following unification.

In terms of law, the Chinese scholars proposed a “de-nationalization” and “de-centralization” of the old legal system, transferring the whole body of law to the SAR regulations. They called for ensuring that “patriots govern Taiwan,” while the existing political parties could be retained under the new constitution. This diverges from the 2022 white paper, which was silent on this topic.

Taiwan is a fully functioning democracy with a pluralistic, multiparty electoral system. Since the democratization in the 1990s, the two dominant parties at the national level have been the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), both holding the presidency and controlling parliament at different times. The KMT generally favors closer cross-strait relations and engagement with China, while the DPP generally emphasizes Taiwan’s distinct identity and supports maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence and autonomy, while officially calling for the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 

China, on the other hand, is a one-party state with the leadership of the Communist Party embedded in the PRC Constitution. Alongside the CCP, however, exist eight other legally recognized political parties, all of which accept the CCP’s leadership. While China holds no elections these parties can contest, they participate in the state advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The 12-point consensus also covers a complete reorganization of Taiwan’s administrative divisions and electoral system. The scholars also called for a thorough reform of Taiwanese textbooks to align with the “patriotic and national” education of China.

Post-unification, Taiwan and the mainland are expected to undergo deeper economic integration. Commerce and cultural ties would continue as usual. Taiwan is expected to become a key economic node in the new “Zhejiang-Fujian-Taiwan Greater Bay Area,” which would serve as an Asia-Pacific economic operations center and high-tech industrial base. 

From a geopolitical perspective, the scholars envision Taiwan becoming an “eastern bulwark of national security.” Taiwan has a pivotal position in the First Island Chain, a strategic line of islands from Japan, through Taiwan to the Philippines, that limit China’s direct and uninterrupted access to the Western Pacific. Taiwan is geopolitically perceived as both the gateway for China’s expansion into the Pacific and as a frontline for external interference in China’s mainland.

Perspective From Taiwan

According to commentary on the symposium, no participants from Taiwan took part, including Taiwanese figures who favor closer cross-strait ties or eventual unification. One online commentary offered two explanations. First, it claimed that Taiwanese scholars were not invited out of concern for their safety. Due to the sensitivity of the topics discussed – especially unification through “non-peaceful means” – the article argued that attendance could expose pro-unification figures to repercussions at home. Separately, however, the author bluntly stated that Taiwan’s interests should not constrain China’s national interests. The absence of any Taiwanese voices at the symposium nonetheless raises the question of how much decision-making power Beijing would be willing to grant to Taiwanese people post-unification.

In late August 2026, shortly before the symposium took place, Ci-Ze Li, an associate professor at Taiwan’s National Changhua University of Education, published three essays on what a Taiwan-specific version of “One Country, Two Systems” might involve. His proposal, according to his words, was a conditional exercise, not a claim that Taiwanese society had accepted unification. 

Assuming a single sovereign state for the sake of discussion, Li argued that Taiwan should retain democratic elections, judicial authority, financial autonomy, and locally controlled defense forces. He also proposed constitutional safeguards that would make it harder for Beijing to withdraw these guarantees unilaterally. Specifically, he called for a Taiwan-specific chapter in the PRC Constitution, a Basic Law, and a charter endorsed by Taiwan’s voters. 

His proposals differed sharply from the symposium’s consensus. Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office nonetheless welcomed discussion of such proposals in Taiwan, with spokesperson Zhu Fenglian stating that engaging earlier and more broadly would bring Taiwan greater benefits.

In response to these discussions, Liang Wen-chieh, the deputy minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), stated that Beijing would not accept Li’s conditions, since China’s approach to “One Country, Two Systems” amounts to replicating the Hong Kong model in Taiwan. Liang added that as long as the CCP retains absolute leadership, any guarantees offered by Beijing would lack credibility, and that Taiwan would not accept the formula on any terms. These statements reflect the position of the government in Taipei.

The latest public opinion survey commissioned by Taiwan’s MAC and conducted by National Chengchi University in August 2026 found that 81.2 percent of respondents opposed Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” proposal, while 83.9 percent agreed that Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million citizens. Furthermore, 65.8 percent of respondents considered Beijing’s attitude toward the Taiwanese government unfriendly, and 51.1 percent expressed the same view regarding its attitude toward the Taiwanese people. 

Support for eventual or immediate unification dropped among Taiwanese respondents from 23.2 percent to 7.8 percent between 2000 and 2026. The decline in support for unification is consistent with a stronger, distinct Taiwanese identity and with a growing share of people who see Taiwan as their primary political community and democracy as a defining feature of that community.

Taiwan’s Contested Status

The unification of Taiwan with China is portrayed by Xi as nothing less than an “inevitable requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The CCP today holds that Taiwan has been part of China since antiquity, that it was ceded to Japan in 1895 during what official Chinese narratives call the “century of humiliation,” and that it was returned in 1945 under the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. It also holds that the PRC, as the successor to the ROC in 1949, holds sovereignty over the island.

The CCP position on Taiwan has not always been consistent, however. In their analysis in the Pacific Affairs journal from 1979, Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan found that in a number of official documents dated between 1928 and 1943, the CCP described Taiwanese as a distinct nation or nationality (minzu) and Taiwan as a colony entitled to self-determination. Today, by framing Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, the CCP reinforces an idea of shared national identity and mobilizes patriotic sentiment.

Supporters of Taiwan’s independence point to the growing Taiwanese identity and argue that Taiwan meets all legal criteria of statehood and is entitled to self-determination, a principle embedded in the international system and recognized in Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter. Beijing argues that self-determination does not override territorial integrity that was broken during the 19th century, when the administration of Taiwan was transferred from Qing China to imperial Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).

The legal and historical claims on which Beijing and Taipei rest their position remain contested. The facts of administration are, however, not disputable: The PRC has never exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan.

The 12-point consensus offers a window into how China might approach the governance of Taiwan post-unification. This is a scholarly consensus, not official policy. The consensus from the symposium is nonetheless unusually detailed, answering some questions the 2022 white paper left open, and dropping earlier assurances such as the pledge not to station troops in Taiwan. Whether official statements adopt these specifics are indicators to watch.