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Orgo-Life the new way to the future Advertising by AdpathwayThis summer, the departure of more than a dozen established scientists from American universities to China caused a stir in the international press. They were established figures across a variety of disciplines – mainly in the sciences – from quantum computing to biochemistry to artificial intelligence. In one high-profile example, Nobel Prize winner Omar Yaghi left the University of California, Berkeley to lead an AI research institute at Tsinghua University. Several National Academy members also left U.S. universities for positions in China. Many had spent more than a decade, and in some cases several decades, building long careers in the United States.
These departures had been long in the making. Fueled by frustration with the Trump administration’s stringent immigration and national security policies in both its first and second terms, an unprecedented number of researchers say they are considering leaving the U.S.
“Actually, I have been thinking about returning to China for the past few years, especially in the last year or two, due to some geopolitical issues and the state of Sino-U.S. relations,” Zhang Yitang told Phoenix TV in August 2025. Zhang, a renowned mathematician, joined Sun Yat-sen University in 2025 after more than a decade in the United States. “Many Chinese scholars and professors in the United States have already returned, and many others are currently considering it.”
Like Zhang, several of these departing scholars are ethnically Chinese academics who earned their initial degrees on the mainland before rising to build elite careers in the United States.
For generations, the flow of global talent was almost entirely one-directional: “China trained the foundational talent while the United States absorbed the top tier,” explained Dai Mingjie, a scholar at South China University of Technology’s Institute of Public Policy. American institutions, which have long led the world in research funding, facilities, and influence, were highly coveted destinations for foreign talent. Researchers also had ample pathways to enter the domestic workforce after graduation through the H-1B visa, while U.S. universities offered early career researchers levels of independence that were rarely found in the more hierarchical academic systems of Europe or East Asia.
This arrangement supplied the United States with a deep well of scientific talent for over half a century. In 2021, foreign-born scholars accounted for 43 percent of the U.S. science and engineering workforce holding doctoral degrees. Chinese-origin researchers in particular showed exceptionally high stay rates: among those who earned doctorates on temporary visas at American universities, 81 percent were still in the country a decade later.
But the current is now beginning to flow in reverse. The change began with the first Trump administration, when the Department of Justice launched the China Initiative in 2018. Though the program’s ostensible purpose was to investigate suspected spying and theft of trade secrets, it resulted in few successful espionage prosecutions – instead largely indicting academics for minor mistakes on administrative forms. Several prominent cases, including that of MIT professor Gang Chen – who was arrested in 2021 over non-disclosure of Chinese affiliations on federal grant applications before prosecutors dropped all charges a year later – drew widespread condemnation from Asian American organizations for racial profiling. “The community was concerned that the initiative was reinforcing the perpetual foreigner stereotype,” said Dr. Jeremy Wu of APA Justice.
Although the Biden administration nominally ended the China Initiative in 2022, the chilling effects on the academic community were clear to see. In a survey of U.S.-based scientists of Chinese descent, 72 percent reported feeling unsafe conducting academic research, and 61 percent indicated they had considered leaving the United States. By the advent of the second Trump administration, experienced Chinese-origin researchers were returning to China at an annual rate several times higher than they had two decades prior.
Under the second Trump administration, the federal government has pressed forward with an aggressive “America First” agenda. Against a backdrop of escalating China-U.S. tensions, the administration has restricted visas, increased scrutiny of foreign scholars, and limited federal research funding – all meant to curb foreign influence at U.S. universities. In May 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced plans to “aggressively” revoke visas held by Chinese students with ties to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) institutions, or those enrolled in technology fields with sensitive national security applications.
One affected student was Xiaotian Liu, a computer science doctoral researcher at Dartmouth, whose status was terminated that spring. Although a federal judge restored his status after Li sued the Department of Homeland Security, the enforcement action caused widespread anxiety among international students. “Who knows if they’ll be hit by the iron fist tomorrow?” one student told Chinese media.
The anxiety has only been compounded by the uncertain state of federal research budgets. For the 2026 fiscal year, the administration proposed to cut several billion dollars across federal science agencies, including a nearly 57 percent cut to the National Science Foundation (NSF). Although Congress ultimately rejected the most severe funding reductions, the threat alone was enough to alter plans for early-career researchers. Han Fu, a biomedical doctoral applicant who spoke with Chinese media, said he started eyeing Singapore and Europe early last year. “I originally wanted to choose the United States because of its leading position in biomedical research,” said Han. “But if the broader environment is unfavorable, I have no choice but to look elsewhere.”
Meanwhile, Beijing has deliberately moved to capitalize on this mass exodus of talent. Speaking at a national science and technology conference over the summer, President Xi Jinping urged China to “seize the window of opportunity created by global talent flows and actively attract outstanding young talent and teams from overseas.” Ahead of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan – which launched this year with a heavy emphasis on technological self-reliance – the country’s annual spending on research and development reached 3.63 trillion yuan, or approximately 2.7 percent of GDP in 2024. Beijing also offers incoming researchers generous perks, including startup capital, housing subsidies, and up to 800,000 yuan directly in research grants for eligible scholars.
Such incentives have been frequently cited by returning academics as a decisive factor in their relocation. Jiaming Chen, a former Duke University professor who spent over three decades working in the United States, told China Science Daily: “In recent years, the overall research environment in China has changed enormously… investment in science and technology has increased substantially, and research conditions are comparable to those of world-leading institutions.”
Chinese universities are also trying to tackle their notorious reputation for neijuan – the hypercompetitive culture of “involution” that has long plagued mainland academia. In August 2023, the State Council and the Central Committee issued a joint directive seeking to alleviate burdens on early-career faculty by curbing administrative tasks and mitigating the pressure to “publish or perish.” The directive mandates that early-career scientists spend over 80 percent of their working time directly engaged in active research.
Several new research institutes are implementing these operational changes to a seemingly positive effect. Neuroscientist Dan Yang, who left UC Berkeley in 2025 to join the Shenzhen Medical Academy of Research and Translation, highlighted its “research-without-worries” model designed to minimize administrative overhead and grant application burdens. As Yang told China Science Daily: “I can now confidently devote all my energy to research.”
For others, the attraction of China lies less in government subsidies than in the chance to apply their work more quickly to its large and rapidly-expanding industrial base. “The rapid development of China’s biomedical industry allows me to translate my research results into clinical applications more quickly, benefiting more people,” said Ma Shixin, an immunologist who joined the Shenzhen Medical Academy of Research and Translation last year. “This was the most important reason that prompted me to choose to return to China.”
Whatever their individual motivations, the influx of returning scholars has made a significant impact on Chinese scientific output, as researchers bring back the expertise and connections they established during their time in the United States. In 2023, China surpassed the United States for the first time on the Nature Index, which tracks contributions to papers in a set of leading natural science journals.
A study analyzing scientific publications estimated that returnees contributed to 38 percent of China-addressed papers, while Chinese diaspora scholars accounted for 27 percent of U.S.-addressed papers. Papers involving either group also received more citations on average than other papers from their respective countries, a sign of the lasting value of those international networks.
All this jockeying for talent sits within a larger great power competition over who will control crucial technologies ahead. Washington seeks to preserve its edge in the race, while restricting Beijing’s access to advanced technologies such as high-end semiconductors crucial for training frontier AI models. Beijing, for its part, aims to achieve breakthroughs that bypass foreign chokepoints and close the gap in key industries. Both powers are also keeping an eye on the future, seeking to gain early ground in frontier fields like quantum computing.
China and the United States are fishing in the same pool of talent, particularly in fields both countries see as top priorities, like AI research. A report from the Carnegie Endowment found that 57 percent of elite AI researchers in its 2025 sample earned their undergraduate degrees in China. The United States is ultimately still a net importer of this talent, while China still suffers a net loss. But the U.S. edge depends heavily on its ability to keep drawing foreign-trained talent – a questionable assumption as more researchers decide to stay in their home countries or leave the U.S., driven in no small part by tighter immigration rules.
For the United States, the long-term cost of this slow attrition could prove much harder to reverse than the departure of any single star researcher. Lizzi Lee, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, explained: “If fewer top Chinese students come to the U.S. for Ph.D.s, fewer stay for postdocs, and faculty become less funded… then the U.S. loses not just top talents today, but a large part of the mechanism through which it has historically replenished its scientific pipeline.” As key research hubs once concentrated in the United States are dispersed globally, foreign institutions gain greater influence over the trajectory of global science, threatening the dominant position U.S. universities have long held in shaping future research frontiers.
But for many, nativism will always be the enemy of scientific progress. In an interview with Chinese media, Director of Carnegie China Ma Yang warned against politicizing scientific research. “So far, humanity has not found a better way to continuously generate breakthrough innovation than bringing together large numbers of talented people from different backgrounds and allowing them to openly exchange different ideas,” Ma said.
He added: “If the movement of people were to stop completely, both countries would suffer enormous negative consequences.”


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